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Résumé  
L’objectif de ce papier est d’analyser la relation entre le succès du projet 
entrepreneurial et la position du réseau des groupes (corporate) en France. En 
utilisant l’analyse de réseau, nous trouvons que les grands groupes 
représentent l’acteur central de ces réseaux. Les résultats mettent en valeur la 
relation négative entre les mesures de centralités et le taux d’échec (qui 
mesure la proportion d’échec des investissements). Le fait d’avoir plusieurs 
liens peut compromettre l’attention des grandes entreprises vis-à-vis des 
jeunes entreprises. Les résultats suggèrent que les entreprises bien établies 
financent de nombreuses jeunes entreprises, elles peuvent de ce fait devenir 
trop occupées pour participer efficacement aux projets innovants. 
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Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the survival of the 
venture and the corporations’ network position in the French corporate venturing 
network. Using network analysis, we find that big corporations are the central actor 
in these networks. The findings highlight a negative relation between centrality 
metrics and the failure rate (which measures the proportion of failed investments). 
Having many ties can compromise the attention of large corporations on the focal 
young company. The results suggest that when established companies finance many 
young companies, they may become too busy to participate effectively to innovative 
projects.  
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Introduction 
 
Within networks, firms can learn from one another and benefit from new knowledge 
developed by other organizations. Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994) and Galaskiewicz 
(1996) consider that networks facilitate the organizational learning process that 
emerges from collaboration.  Knowledge transfer among organizations provides 
opportunities for collaboration that stimulates the creation of new knowledge and 
access to R&D projects. Established firms operating in competitive markets are 
willing to obtain innovative capabilities in order to maintain profitability 
(Shumpeter, 1942). Several studies have stressed the organizational limits of large 
firms to generate creative capabilities internally (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Henderson, 1993). In fact, a company’s innovation capacity depends on its ability to 
integrate diverse skill set, i.e. ability to acquire and implement external knowledge 
(Teece et al., 1997; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Arrow, 1974). Consequently, a 
growing number of firms have begun innovating and developing strategies in order 
to secure technologies existing outside their boundaries (Chesbrough, 2002; Van de 
Vrande et al., 2011). This situation has motivated multiple scholars to focus on the 
ways large firms’ source, value and assimilate external capabilities (Dushnitsky and 
Lenox, 2006). It includes mergers and acquisitions (Ahuja and Katila, 2001), 
strategic alliances (Ahuja, 2000), etc. More recently, established companies invested 
in entrepreneurial ventures, such investment–often referred to as Corporate 
Venturing (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). Corporate venture capital is “corporate 
capital invested for the establishment of an investment in entrepreneurial ventures” 
(Schildt, Maula, and Keil 2005). 
Research about Corporate Venturing focus on understanding motives for established 
companies to engage in corporate venturing, and factors contributing to the 
successes and failure of CV. Corporate venturing, as a strategic option, enables large 
companies to revitalize and improve   their strategic and financial performance by 
exploring new opportunities in entrepreneurial firms – external corporate venturing 
(e.g., Benson and Ziedonis 2009; Covin and Miles 2007; Garrett and Neubaum 
2013; Wadhwa and Basu 2013) or by exploiting existing assets – internal corporate 
venturing (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2006; Hill and Birkinshaw 2008). According to 
Leten and Van Dyck (2012), corporate venturing is a practice whereby a company 
sets up a separate organizational unit to invest in new technological and business 
opportunities arising within or outside the boundaries of the firm, for long-term 
strategic and/or short-term financial purposes. Corporations may prefer joining 
forces with other established companies over being the sole investor in order to 
promote the development of young and innovative companies. In the venture capital 
industry, venture capitalists tend to syndicate their investments with other VCs, 
rather than investing alone (Lerner, 1994). While the literature documents the 
prevalence of networks in many financial markets, the performance consequences of 
this organizational structure remain largely unknown. Considering a social network 
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perspective, in this paper, we address the following question: Does a corporate 
network position affect the survival likelihood of investments? More generally, we 
consider that an examination of social context constitute a gap in the corporate 
venturing research.  Noyes et al. (2014) examined the relation between the number 
of investments a corporate venture capital does and its network position. They argue 
that a firm’s network position and its proximity to firms with information about 
corporate venture capital investment experience should facilitate corporate venture 
capital investments. But, the opposite could be true: network distance from other 
corporations should constrain a corporation’s implication in the corporate venture, 
and therefore on the success of a corporation’s investments. In the interlocking 
directorates’ literature, multiple directorships can have a negative impact on the 
firm’s performance for companies operating in highly regulated sectors (Kaczmarez 
et al., 2012). This concern is commonly based on the busyness hypothesis, which 
proposes that many external board appointments are likely to compromise the 
quality of work of the focal company board. The idea that interlocking directorships 
may be ‘a double-edged’ sword, i.e. apparently beneficial, yet having negative 
implications when used excessively, is reflected in the mixed findings in research on 
the long debated interlocking-firm performance relationship: positive, negative or no 
association between the two variables (e.g., Geletkanycz and Boyd 2011; Kiel and 
Nicholson 2006; Loderer and Peyer 2002 ; Yeo et al. 2003). Similarly, we assume 
that multi-corporate venture may affect negatively the success likelihood of the 
young company when used excessively. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the literature review. The 
methodology is presented in section 2. Results are presented and discussed in 
section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
1. Literature review  
 
In the corporate venturing literature, we find several motives that may explain the 
practice of multi-corporate venturing between large firms. On the one hand, benefits 
that could explain why corporations syndicate their investments are strategic 
(Anokhin et al., 2011). Winters and Murfin (1988) list a number of benefits and 
argue that “acquisition is the most perceived benefit”. Another benefit of contacts to 
highly innovative startups is to acquire licenses of promising technology in 
exchange for venture capital. This can help corporations that are struggling to bring 
out new and innovative products to compete in their market. Even if the venture is 
not willing to license (and maybe lose) its technology it can sell the marketing rights 
to the corporation. The venture benefits from the much greater marketing experience 
and contacts of the corporation, and the corporation can offer new products to its 
customers. 
Especially in technology-oriented markets, it makes sense to use corporate venturing 
as a window on technology (Lantz and Sahut, 2010). Winters and Murfin (1988) 
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mention several examples where the detailed knowledge of venture company 
activities obtained by involvement in venture capital has influenced the strategic 
planning of major corporations. Moreover, by supporting many new ventures, large 
companies can screen and access many promising technologies, with a view to 
possibly internalizing them subsequently (Chesbrough and Tucci, 2004). Most 
importantly, the strategic benefits of networking include opportunities to observe 
and learn about fellow investors’ operational processes, know-how and capabilities 
(Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007), how they conduct their corporate venture 
investments and how they internalize innovative ideas championed by syndicate 
partners and their investees (Gulati, 1999).  
Another possibility for corporate venturing is to support the funding of ventures 
from within the corporation, known as internal (corporate) venturing or 
intrapreneurship. There may be people within the corporation that have significant 
entrepreneurial skills, but have doubts to leave the company and found the venture 
on their own. In addition, due to the mere activity in corporate venturing, the 
company will get contacts to “technology-based investment bankers, entrepreneurs, 
scientists, deal finders and makers, consultants and the whole network of people 
who drive the venture capital process” (Winters and Murfin, 1988). The corporation 
gets in touch with the people during their usual operation, and these contacts may 
result in business opportunities, which would probably not have emerged in any 
other way (Sykes, 1990). In addition, identification of new business opportunities 
and development of business relationships are on top of the corporate venture 
manager’s list of strategic objectives. In his study, Dushnitsky (2004) argues that 
corporate venture capital is a paradox: “The actions which aid a firm to assess and 
benefit from corporate venturing inhibit an investment relationship with an 
innovative venture.” His reasoning is that, e.g., corporations that use corporate 
venturing as a window on novel and disrupting technology will unlikely get their 
hands on this technology because entrepreneurs often dislike disclosing their 
intellectual property early on. Without being able to correctly evaluate the 
technology, corporations will not invest in the venture. He concludes that mostly 
complementary technologies will be acquired through corporate venturing. Further, 
Chesbrough and Tucci (2004) show that, corporate venture capital is positively 
related to corporate innovation and, is an important tool for sourcing external ideas. 
Above all, the strategic benefits of multi-corporate venturing include opportunities 
to observe and learn about other investors: operational process, know-how and 
capabilities, how they conduct their corporate venturing investments, how they 
internalize innovative ideas (Anokhin et al, 2011). They argue that investing in a 
venture fund or Venture Company may help to identify better suiting acquisition 
targets. The corporation simply examines the ventures during their start-up process 
and invests only in ventures promising a synergistic fit.  
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Through its network of partners in the corporate venturing network, corporations 
have the opportunity to observe and learn from other investors.  Joining forces, the 
partners will promote the development of young innovative companies.   
According to van Wijk et al. (2008) “the closer they are to those who control the 
relevant sources of information, the more corporate investors can benefit from the 
experience of other syndicate members and the more access to knowledge and 
opportunities they can gain”. 
Based on network analysis, Hochberg et al. (2007) examine the performance 
consequence of relationships and networks in the context of relationships established 
when VCs syndicate portfolio company investment. Their findings indicate that 
better-networked VC firms experience better fund performance. Existing literature 
demonstrates at least two reasons to expect that syndicated networks improve the 
quality of deal flow causing better fund performance. On the one hand, VCs invite 
other to co-invest in their promising deals in the expectation of future reciprocity 
(Lerner, 1994). On the other hand, by checking each other’s willingness to invest in 
potentially promising deals, VCs can pool correlated signals and thereby select 
better investments in situations of often extreme uncertainty about the viability and 
return potential of investment proposals (Wilson, 1968; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). 
Moreover, syndication helps diffuse information across sector boundaries allowing 
VCs to diversify their portfolios (Stuart and Sorensen, 2001). According to 
Hochberg et al. (2007), centrality of corporations matter in the performance of 
young firms. 
H1: It is expected to find a positive relationship between CV centrality and the 
business survival. 
However, and according to the busyness hypothesis of interlocking directorates, 
when used in excess (when too many ventures are supported at the same time), 
interlocking is likely to compromise the attention of directors on the focal company 
board. Similarly, in the corporate venturing context, large companies may not to be 
able to devote sufficient time and energy to contribute in the corporate venture with 
the entrepreneurial company. In other words, when corporations finance many 
young companies, they may become too busy to conduct effective innovative 
projects.  
A firm's network centrality refers to the degree to which the firm has a strategically 
important position in the network (Freeman, 1979). In fact, the empirical evidence 
on the linkage between degree centrality and firm performance is very limited and 
mixed.  On the one hand, being central in a network provides a focal firm various 
information advantages (in the form of access), control benefits (i.e. power) and 
learning (Gulati, 1999).  For example, Shan et al. (1994) found that the number of 
ties between start-up firms and established firms is positively related to innovative 
output in biotechnology industry.  Gulati (1999) found that the number of alliances 
formed by the focal firm affects its capability to form new alliances in the future. On 
the other hand, having many links may constrain the activity of the company.  
Fligstein and Brantly (1992) find a negative association between networks of 
  
6 
 
directors and profitability for a large sample of US companies. Loderer and Peyer 
(2002) generate a similar finding for Swiss listed companies. 
Stuart (2000) found that a simple count of the number of alliances does not affect 
firm performance as measured by rate of innovation and rate of sales growth.  
H2: It is expected to find a negative relationship between CV centrality and the 
business survival. 
2. Network Analysis Methodology 
 
Network analysis aims to describe the structure of networks by focusing on the 
relationships that exist among a set of economic actors. A key aim is to identify 
influential actors. Influence is measured by how “central” an actor’s network 
position is, based on the extent of his involvement in relationships with others. 
Network analysis uses graph theory to make the concept of centrality more defined. 
Consider the network illustrated in Figure 1, which graphs the multicorporates 
venturing among French corporation over the period 1995 through 2015. 
Figure 1: Corporate Venturing Network over the period 1995-2015 
 
Corporations are represented as nodes and links represent the ties among them. In 
this network, it appears that two firms—2 and 37—are the most “central” in this 
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network, in the sense that they are connected to the most corporations, and that firm 
2 is invited to co invest  most often. 
In graph theory, a network such as the one illustrated in Figure 1 is represented by a 
square “adjacency” matrix, the cells of which reflect the ties among the actors in the 
network. In our setting, we code two corporations coinvesting in the same 
entrepreneurial company as having a tie. 
Adjacency matrices can be “symmetric” or “asymmetric.” Only asymmetric 
matrices differentiate between the originator and the receiver of a tie. In our setting, 
a symmetric adjacency matrix records as a tie any participation by both corporation i 
and corporation j in a multicorporate venture.  
We therefore construct our adjacency matrix and calculate centrality measures based 
on three popular concepts of centrality, specifically, degree, closeness, and 
betweenness. Here, we focus on how each measure captures to some extent different 
aspect of the role of corporations in the corporate venturing network. 
2.1. Degree Centrality 
 
Degree centrality measures the number of relationships an actor in the network has. 
Corporations that have ties to many other corporations may not be able to contribute 
effectively to projects. Since they have many ties, they become too busy and have to 
control a wider range of expertise, contacts, and pools of capital. It may also be a 
resource allocation problem. Formally, degree counts the number of unique ties each 
corporation has, that is, the number of unique corporations with which a corporation 
has co invested. Let  = 1 if at least one common corporate venture exists between 
corporation i and j, and zero otherwise. Corporation i’s degree then equals  ∑  . 
2.2. Closeness 
 
While degree counts the number of relationships an actor has, closeness takes into 
account their “quality” (Hochberg et al., 2007). Closeness centrality is defined as the 
total graph theoretic distance to all other nodes in the network. Closeness centrality 
thus characterizes the reach of the ego to all other nodes of the network. A node with 
a high central closeness score (which mean highly central), means that partners are 
very close which can impact negatively the performance of corporations. However, 
if they are very close, the venture could ask for more funds and hope get a favorable 
management compared to other elements or nodes that are not as close. 
2.3. Betweenness 
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Betweenness attributes influence to actors on whom many others must rely to make 
connections within the network. In our setting, betweenness proxies for the extent to 
which a corporation may act as an intermediary by bringing together corporations 
with complementary skills or investment opportunities that lack a direct relationship 
between them. Formally, let  be the proportion of all paths linking actors j and k 
that pass through actor i. 
Actor i’s betweenness is defined as  ∑∀
 ≠  ≠  . Again, we normalize by 
dividing by the maximum betweenness in an n-actor network. 
3. Sample and Data 
 
To explore corporate venture network, we use data from France. We use the 
ThomsonOne database to select French companies that receive funding from at 
least one CVC. As signaled by Lee and Kang (2015), this database is frequently 
used in the VC literature. It enables us to collect information about each deal, 
especially on syndication, the round-by-round VC investments and the stage 
level of the funded venture. We then extract the number of investments and the 
number of VC firms at each round for each backed company. This allow us to 
get information about all VC funders, including the firm type (CVC, bank 
affiliated, Government Affiliated VC, etc.), the company and firm address and 
zip code, The CVC founded year, the number of funds managed by the CVC, the 
total number of deals and the total number of companies invested in by the CVC. 
Using ThomsonOne database enables us to observe the failure of the funded 
companies (if the company is defunct or bankrupt)The initial data set for this 
study consisted of all the investment decisions made by 476 corporations over 
the years from 1989 to 2016 giving a total of 3304 investment decisions.  
In this data set, there is a high degree of variation in the way the name of an 
organization (Corporate venture, target companies and Funds) is recorded for 
different investment projects it is involved in. The use of data in this form, 
hence, results in treating the same organization as several different organizations 
depending on the number of different names under which it is recorded.  
 We eliminate this ambiguity in organizations’ name before running the analysis. 
  
As a result we end up with a sample of 453 corporations and 406 target firm 
involved in 2729 investment decisions including 392 non syndicated investments 
and 2337 syndicated investments.  
To explore the relation between the probability of failure of the investment and 
the network position, we consider three key variables: degree centrality, 
betweenness and closeness. 
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Type Concept Variables 
Dependent Successes or 
Failures of the 
investment 
Failure rate which is equal to the number of 
failed and bankrupted investments by the total 
number of investments of a company. 
Independent Corporations 
centrality metrics 
Degree centrality 
Betweenness centrality 
Closeness centrality 
Control Investments 
portfolio of the 
corporate 
The whole number of investments financed by 
the corporation. 
3.1. The French Corporate Venturing Network 
3.1.1.  The Network’s characteristics 
 
Figure 2: Investment amount 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ratio H/I 0,0584 0,0384 0,1959 0 1 
degree 14,1218 303,5893 17,4238 0 131 
normalized degree 0,0297 0,0013 0,0367 0 0,2758 
weighted degree 73,1576 28986,0783 170,2530 0 1346 
0
2 000 000
4 000 000
6 000 000
8 000 000
10 000 000
12 000 000
14 000 000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Amount of Investment
No syndication Syndication
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eccentricity 5,3592 1,5738 1,2545 0 8 
closness_centrality 0,3863 0,0170 0,1302 0 1 
harmonicclosnesscentrality 0,4119 0,0175 0,1323 0 1 
betweeness_centrality 0,0033 0,0001 0,0116 0 0,1289 
modularity_class 4,8109 18,0694 4,2508 0 21 
clustering 0,7037 0,1068 0,3268 0 1 
triangles 71,5756 17655,8785 132,8754 0 978 
4. Results and discussion 
Before we start with the regression analysis, let us examine a few bivariate plots that might 
provide the first insight into the relationship between the network position of a CV and the 
probability of failure of the target firm in which the CV has invested. 
In Figure 2, we plot the fraction of CV fund’s investments in the target firms, which later 
became defunct due to bankruptcy, against the three centrality measures (degree, closeness 
and betweenness). Although these plots cannot fully capture the true relationship, inspecting 
the graphs we notice several features. First, in case of degree and closeness centralities, the 
relationship between the fraction of failed target firms and the centralities of the CVs is non-
monotonic: funds with few connections and/or being distant from the centre of the network 
tend to have low fractions of their target firms that ultimately failed. As the centrality is 
increasing that fraction start to rise, however after certain threshold it starts decreasing again 
and firms with many connections and/or being at the centre of the entire network also have 
lower fraction of failed target firms.  
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Figure 2: Share of failed targets as the function of CV’s centrality (degree, closeness, and betweenness) 
 
Interestingly, when we turn to betweenness centrality (Figure 2, right-most panel) we find 
that the fraction of failed investments seems to be monotonically decreasing with the 
centrality score  
 
5. Regression analysis 
For each of the three centrality measures we have estimated two specifications of negative 
binomial regression: a linear model and a model with a quadratic term to account for possible 
non-monotonic relationship between centrality and probability of targets’ failures. The 
results of estimation are reported in Table 1 (see the Annex). 
The results of the regression, indeed, confirm what we have noticed when inspecting Figure 
2. Statistical significance of the coefficients of the quadratic terms of the degree centrality in 
model 2 suggests that the relationship between centrality and the probability of successful 
investment is, indeed, non-monotonic. The probability of investing in a target that will 
become defunct is relatively low when firm has few connections or have many connections 
with other CV funds. As the number of connections increases, the probability of making a 
‘wrong’ investment is steadily increasing, until it reaches maximum and starts decreasing. 
We illustrate this pattern with the predicted probability (for the total number of investments 
set at its mean) plotted against degree in the right panel of Figure 3. 
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We find similar pattern in the estimated regression for closeness centrality: the significance 
of the regression coefficient at the square of closeness centrality suggests that, as in case of 
the degree centrality, the relationship between closeness and probability of investing in a 
target that will fail is first increasing with the closeness, but then the effect of the closeness 
levels up and further increase in closeness results in better performance. 
Figure 3: Predicted  probability of targets’ bankruptcy as the function of CV’s centrality 
 
We have drastically different picture for the betweenness centrality. In both linear and 
quadratic models we found that the linear term is not significant (Table 1, model 6). 
Excluding statistically non-significant term from the regression we obtain model 7. The 
predicted probability of failed investment plotted against betweenness centrality is shown at 
Figure 2 (most-right panel). As one can see the probability to invest in a target firm that 
would fail is monotonically decreasing with betweenness centrality of CV fund. This result 
suggests that a target that receives investment from CV funds with higher betweenness 
centralities (i.e. located in strategically important positions in-between many other investors) 
is less likely to fail.  
 
6. Conclusion 
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Corporations and politicians consider corporate venturing as an important tool for 
innovation (Dauderstädt, 2013).   
Corporate Venturing supports firm innovation, drives up firm value, and  
provides management with tools to identify emerging trends in advanced 
technology. More precisely, corporate venturing is established corporations invest in 
and partner with entrepreneurial companies. By doing so, established companies are 
able to identify and source new emerging technologies from entrepreneurial 
companies. Corporate Venturing approaches have as their commonality the addition 
or the development of new business via equity investments within the corporation 
(Zhou, 2015). This can be accomplished through three implementation modes: 
internal corporate venturing, cooperative venturing and external corporate venturing. 
To achieve fast growth opportunities with different level of uncertainty, the 
investing corporation has to allocate resources strategically to finance the most 
promising projects that maximize the whole growth value of the investment 
portfolio (Lin and Lee, 2011). Uncertainty and risk associated with the investment 
are the main drivers of syndication (Ozdemir, 2006). Our study focuses on the 
network of corporation engaged in the corporate venturing network on the French 
market. 
The goal of this paper is to explore whether a corporate position in the network is 
associated with the failure rate. In other words, is there any relationship between 
corporations’ centrality and its failure rate? 
 
The results generate U-shaped relation between centrality metrics and the failure rate 
(which measures the proportion of failed investments). Having many ties can 
compromise the attention of large corporations on the focal young company. The 
results suggest that when established companies finance many young companies, 
they may become too busy to participate effectively to innovative projects. 
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ANNEX 
Table 1: Results of the regression analysis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Degree 
0.0181**
* 
0.0498**
*     
 
Degree
2
 
 
-
0.0004**
* 
    
 
Closeness 
  
12.4450*
** 
55.107** 
  
 
Closeness
2
 
   
-62.334* 
  
 
Betweennn
ess     
-9.100 25.046  
Betweennn
ess
2
      
-
370.54**
* 
-
242.77**
* 
       
 
Intercept 
-
2.6217**
* 
-
3.0010**
* 
-
6.3762**
* 
-
13.592**
* 
-
2.417*** 
-
2.455*** 
-
2.451*** 
Total 
number of 
investments 
0.1303**
* 
0.1348**
* 
0.1179**
* 
0.123*** 0.173*** 0.163*** 0.177*** 
       
 
Null 
deviance / 
df 
588.14  / 
916 
628.96  / 
916 
620.70  / 
916 
625.70  / 
916 
574.37  / 
916 
600.48 / 
916 
592.72  / 
916 
Residual 
deviance / 
df 
398.97  / 
914 
410.78  / 
913 
397.75  / 
914 
398.04  / 
913 
401.08  / 
914 
410.28 / 
913 
407.56  / 
914 
AIC 932.52 921.44 911.33 910.64 943.38 938.15 938.24 
 
one position. 
